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Immediately after the attempted assassination of President
Ronald Reagan in Washington, D.C. on the early afternoon of
March 30, 1981, Secret Service agents and the District of Co-
lumbia police arrested John W. Hinckley, Jr. and took him to
the local police headquarters, arriving there at 2:40 p.m. They
wanted to question Hinckley not only as to his motive but also
about the possible involvement of accomplices. Before doing
so, however, they dutifully read to him the warnings of constitu-
tional rights that the Supreme Court in 1966 mandated in its
five to four decision in Miranda v. Arizona.' The warnings given
to Hinckley, as we shall see, contained embellishments of the
ones specified in Miranda, and they were read to him on three
separate occasions within a two hour period. After receiving the
third set of warnings Hinckley was presented with a "waiver of
rights" form on which he responded "yes" to the questions
whether he had read his rights and understood them. Then he
was asked whether he "wished to answer any questions." At this
point Hinckley answered, "I don't know. I'm not sure; I think I
ought to talk to Joe Bates [his father's lawyer in Dallas]." Hinck-
ley added: "I want to talk to you, but first I want to talk to Joe
Bates.
' 2
'Originally printed in 73J. CIUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982).
'384 U.S. 436 (1966). The basic warnings required before any interrogation may be con-
ducted of a custodial suspect are: (1) he has a right to remain silent; (2) anything he says may be
used against him; (3) he has a right to consult with a lawyer before or during the questioning of
him; and (4) if he cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be provided for him without cost. The
Court's own general phraseology of the warnings will be subsequently discussed.
'The above quotations, and the ones which follow, as well as all the case facts reported in
this commentary, are from the published opinion of the court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision suppressing all the statements made
by Hinckley during the interrogation subsequent to his expression of interest in talking to his
father's lawyer. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (1982) (per curiam), affg525 F. Supp.
1342 (1981).
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Following the D.C. police "booking procedure" (identifica-
tion data and fingerprints), and while the police were attempt-
ing to contact Joe Bates, two FBI agents arrived and arrested
Hinckley for violation of the Presidential Assassination Statute.
They were informed of all that had transpired and then took
Hinckley to the FBI field office at approximately 5:15 p.m. He
received the Miranda warnings for the fourth time, at the field
office. He was also presented with another waiver form, sup-
plied by the FBI. Hinckley signed his name to it; however, "it
was clearly understood that he did not waive his right not to an-
swer questions before consulting counsel." Nevertheless, he did
answer various "background" questions asked by FBI agents.
The "background" information was suppressed by the D.C.
District Court. It reasoned that the information was elicited
from Hinckley in violation of Miranda, which prohibits the in-
terrogation of a custodial suspect after he announces or indi-
cates he wants to have a lawyer present.4 As already quoted,
Hinckley had said he wanted one, although he did so rather
hesitatingly.
The district court ruling was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit.5 Both courts rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the questioning of Hinckley at the FBI
office was merely "standard processing procedure" of an "essen-
tially administrative nature." The courts concluded that Hinck-
ley had, in fact, been interrogated and that the purpose of the
questioning was to obtain personal background information
from Hinckley which would negate an anticipated insanity plea
at the time of trial. It was obvious that Hinckley could not deny
he did the shooting, so the only conceivable defense would be
that of insanity. That was, in fact, the plea at his trial, which be-
gan on April 26, 1982.6
In view of the court rulings declaring the "background in-
formation" inadmissible at trial, whatever value that information
may have been to the prosecution was irretrievably lost. The
government decided not to seek Supreme Court review of the
'Presidential Assassination Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1970).
4 United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (1981).
'United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (1982) (per curiam).
'For initial newspaper coverage of the insanity issue, see N.Y. Times Apr. 28, 1982, § 1, at 12,
col. 3.
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appellate court's decision. Reliance had to be placed, there-
fore, upon independent evidence of Hinckley's sanity.
Before proceeding to discuss several other cases to illustrate
the mischief occasioned by Miranda, the writer reiterates that
Hinckley had received the prescribed warnings three times
within a two-hour interval, and that a signed waiver was sought
from him at the D.C. police station when he was asked if he
wished to answer any questions. Nowhere in the Miranda opin-
ion is there anything requiring such a repetition of the warn-
ings, or the need for a signed statement, or the ascertainment of
any other kind of waiver than an indicated willingness to be
questioned. Why, then, the mischief?
The mischief in the Hinckley case resulted from a concern
on the part of law enforcement officers-and an understand-
able concern-that whatever they say to a suspect by way of
Miranda requirements might later be considered inadequate by
a judge or appellate court. Hence, they over-react; they embel-
lish the warnings or add new ones. Each time someone wants to
talk to the suspect, or the same interrogator wants to resume his
interrogation, the warnings are repeated. The repetitive warn-
ings are followed by a request to sign a legalistically shrouded
waiver form. As a consequence of all of this, suspects who might
otherwise have been willing to talk are far less apt to do so.
Another illustration of over-reaction to Miranda appears in
an appellate court case within the District of Columbia that was
decided only one month prior to the interrogation of Hinckley.
In that case, United States v. Alexander7 a suspected murderer re-
ceived the following warnings, as prescribed in a D.C. police
department regulation:
You are under arrest. Before we ask any questions, you must under-
stand what your rights are.
You have the right to remain silent. You are not required to say
anything to us at any time or to answer questions. Anything you say can
be used against you in court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we question
you and to have him with you during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be pro-
vided for you.
If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer present you
will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the
right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
'428 A.2d 42 (D.C. 1981).
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Following a reading of the warnings to the suspect, she was
presented with a printed waiver form, on which the first three
questions were:
1. Have you read or had read to you the warnings as to your rights?
2. Do you understand these rights?
3. Do you wish to answer any questions?
Alongside each of the foregoing questions the suspect wrote
'Yes." The next question was:
4. Are you willing to answer questions without having an attorney
present?
To this fourth question the suspect wrote "No." The next
item on the form was:
5. Signature of defendant on line below.
After the suspect's signature, the remaining portions of the
waiver document contained space for the time, date, and lines
for the signatures of two witnesses.
Following completion of the printed waiver form, a police
officer told the suspect, "[w] e know you are responsible for the
stabbing," whereupon she confessed and agreed to give a writ-
ten statement. At this point, the officer issued "fresh Miranda
warnings."
The trial court in Alexander suppressed the resulting confes-
sion, for the same reason stated in the Hinckley case-the ques-
tioning of a custodial suspect after an indication of an interest
in having a lawyer present. The suppression order was affirmed
by the appellate court. Consequently, the confession could not
be used as evidence at trial.
The warnings that were used in the Alexander case presuma-
bly were the same ones that were given by the D.C. police de-
partment to Hinckley. In those warnings and in the waiver
forms, the police went far beyond what the Supreme Court
mandated in Miranda, or in any of its subsequent decisions prior
to (or since) the interrogations of Alexander and Hinckley.
What the Court stated in Miranda was that before a custodial
suspect could be interrogated
[h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
' 384 U.S. at 479. The formulation of the Miranda warnings in language which seems ade-
quate was suggested in the first footnote to this comment.
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Following this specification of the required warnings, the
Court proceeded to advise interrogators that the suspect's
"[o]pportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation," meaning that if he changed his
mind and decided to remain silent or wanted an attorney pres-
ent he should be accorded that privilege. 9 But this was only a
warning to interrogators, not something for incorporation into
the required warnings to the suspects themselves. The Court
also stated that after the issuance of the warnings, "the individ-
ual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree
to answer questions or make a statement." Finally, the Court
added the mandate that "unless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him."10
The embellishments of the Miranda warnings and the ritu-
alization of the written waiver, as exemplified in the foregoing
Hinckley and Alexander cases, unquestionably have a tendency to
dissuade many guilty suspects from submitting to police ques-
tioning.
The practice of police resort to written waiver is another il-
lustration of over-reaction to Miranda. The Court in Miranda
made no mention of written waivers, and in one of its own sub-
sequent decisions, North Carolina v. Butler," the Court specifi-
cally held that written waivers are not required. In that case the
defendant, as a custodial suspect, orally waived his rights to si-
lence and to have an attorney present, but refused when he was
asked to sign a written waiver. The Supreme Court ruled that
despite the refusal to sign the written waiver, the oral waiver was
sufficient.
The message in Butler has not "trickled down" to some po-
lice departments, and even where it has, over-caution still pre-
vails. Written warnings are still sought, and in some instances
they will contain all the embellishments exemplified by the fol-
lowing form currently being used by a large state department of
law enforcement:
9 Id.
"441 U.S. 369 (1979).
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND WARNINGS
Date Place -Time
Name Date of Birth.
1. THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND NOT
MAKE ANY STATEMENT AT ALL.
I understand this segment (initial)
2. THAT ANYTHING I SAY CAN AND WILL BE USED AGAINST
ME IN A COURT OR COURTS OF LAW FOR THE OFFENSE
OR OFFENSES BYWHICH THIS WARNING IS EXECUTED.
I understand this segment (initial)
3. THAT I CAN HIRE A LAWYER OF MY OWN CHOICE TO BE
PRESENT AND ADVISE ME BEFORE AND DURING ANY
STATEMENT.
I understand this segment (initial)
4. THAT IF I AM UNABLE TO HIRE A LAWYER I CAN
REQUEST AND RECEIVE APPOINTMENT OF A LAWYER BY
THE PROPER AUTHORITY, WITHOUT COST OR CHARGE
TO ME.
I understand this segment (initial)
5. THAT I CAN REFUSE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS OR
STOP GIVING ANY STATEMENT ANY TIME I WANT TO.
I understand this segment (initial)
I have read or have had read to me the five (5) inclusive segments
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Forms such as this are not rare; they, or comparable ones,
are in general usage by many police departments.
Most police departments rely upon the oral issuance of both
the warnings and the waiver questions. Their officers are sup-
plied with printed plastic cards, on one side of which appear the
warnings to be read, and on the other the wavier questions to be
asked. Usually the phraseology on the cards is prepared, or at
least approved, by the local prosecuting attorney. The warnings
on a typical card are as follows:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of
law.
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with
you while you are being questioned.
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to
represent you before any questioning, if you wish.
5. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not an-
swer any questions or make any statements.
The waiver questions sometimes are:
1. Do you understand each of these rights?
2. Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?
Observe, again, the gratuitous inclusion of the fifth warn-
ing. As earlier stated, this is not a warning required by Miranda,
but rather an expression the Supreme Court employed by way
of an admonition to interrogators regarding their obligation in
those instances where a person has already agreed to talk with-
out an attorney being present. It was intended as a guideline in
case situations where, during the course of the interrogation, a
suspect decides to discontinue the conversation or asks for an
attorney. The Court did not indicate that this admonition to in-
terrogators should be included as one of the required warnings
to suspects.
The inquiry on the waiver side of the card about "under-
standing the rights" and "bearing them in mind" is the result of
caution deemed necessary by law enforcement agencies to avoid
being faulted by the courts for obtaining waivers that were not
made "knowingly and intelligently." This was the expression
used by the Court in Miranda.
The phrase "knowingly and intelligently" prompts the writer
to pose the following rhetorical questions for reader considera-
tion. Assume that the person who is about to be interrogated
actually committed the crime. He receives the warnings and is
asked the waiver questions that have been described. If, after
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hearing that ritual, he decides to submit to an interrogation,
does not that fact in itself display a lack of the intelligence nec-
essary to make an intelligent waiver? With all such red-flag-
waving by the interrogator, is it any wonder that many guilty
suspects, the intelligent as well as some unintelligent ones, de-
cide to remain silent or to ask for a lawyer? Presumably the Su-
preme Court only intended that the waiver must be knowingly
made, but mischief has nevertheless resulted from attempts pre-
cisely to satisfy the presumed requirements for waiver. Why else
would a waiver contain the words, "[hiaving these rights in mind,
do you wish to talk to us now?"
What has just been stated about the plastic card guides for
the oral issuance of the warnings, and for the asking of oral
waivers, is true to an even greater degree when a printed form is
used, such as the one earlier reproduced, which requires name-
initialing after each of the five segments of the set of warnings,
to be followed by the suspect's signature, witnessed by two per-
sons.
In addition to over-reaction with regard to the language of
the warnings and waivers, considerable mischief results from the
frequently followed police practice of issuing "fresh" Miranda
warnings every time an interrogation has been renewed by the
original interrogator, or when a different interrogator becomes
involved. This occurs even after the suspect waived his rights
upon the first occasion, and even though only a short time has
elapsed since the first set of warnings were given. Then, too, the
interrogators usually are not content with an oral waiver; they
will also present the suspect with a written one for his signature.
Sometimes the requested signature to a written waiver will
not be forthcoming, as illustrated by the previously discussed
case of North Carolina v. Butler. When this happens, police tes-
timony that the suspect actually made an oral waiver may not be
considered plausible at a confession suppression hearing, in
light of the signature refusal. Also, defense counsel probably
would contend that even assuming an oral waiver, the signature
refusal evidences a change of mind, which, of course, would re-
quire a termination of the interrogation. A factor that should
not be overlooked, however, in any evaluation of a situation of
this type, is the natural reluctance of people generally to sign
any document, regardless of the truthfulness of its disclosures.
As is implicit in what has already been stated, prosecuting
attorneys (and other legal advisors to the police) also partici-
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pate in the over-reaction process. Prosecutors are concerned,
and understandably so, about trial court rejection of confes-
sions, or appellate court reversals of convictions, because of
some presumed flaw in the Miranda warnings or in the waiver.
Even more damaging, however, are the super-cautious warnings
and waiver forms that are prepared or approved for police us-
age, such as the ones already discussed. Prosecutors seem to
exercise as much meticulous care with the warnings and waivers
as they do in the drafting of jury instructions for the presiding
judge. Nothing must be left out!
Not only have the police and prosecutors over-reacted to
Miranda; the same has been true of lower federal courts and of
the state courts at all levels. An early over-reaction by a federal
circuit court of appeals concerned the phraseology of the warn-
ing about the right to agpointed counsel. When the appellant
in Lathers v. United States was to be questioned while a custodial
suspect, the Miranda warnings he received included the state-
ment that "if he was unable to hire an attorney the Commis-
sioner or the Court would appoint one for him." This was held
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to be defective because the
suspect "was not advised that he could have an attorney present
with him before he uttered a syllable." The court said, "[t]he
message to him indicated only that a judge or commissioner
somewhere down the line would appoint a lawyer for him if he
so requested."'  This ruling prevailed for thirteen years in that
circuit, which prescribed the law for the lower federal courts
(and indirectly, therefore, for federal law enforcement officers)
within a six state area.
A recent decision has overruled Lathers. The court in United
States v. Contreras1 4 expressed its reluctance to overturn a prior
decision in its own circuit, but felt impelled to do so because of
the 1981 Supreme Court decision in California v. Prysock.15 In
that case the Supreme Court held there was no requirement
"that the contents of the Miranda warnings be a virtual incanta-
"396 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Id. at 535.
"667 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1982). This appears as a decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which was split off from the Fifth Circuit by Congressional action due to the excessive
case load in the original Fifth Circuit. Nevertheless, in the Contreras opinion the court referred
to the Lather decision as one of its own. The present Eleventh Circuit encompasses Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia; the Fifth Circuit, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and the Canal Zone.
" 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
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tion of the precise language contained in Miranda." Instead, it
is sufficient if the warnings convey the basic rights to the sus-
pect. According to the Contreras court, this meant, therefore,
that the warnings about the right to counsel "need not," as the
earlier Lathers case indicated, "explicitly convey to the accused
his right to counsel 'here and now."' Ultimately, therefore, the
thirteen years of mischief that was created within the Fifth Cir-
cuit was finally dissipated.
An even more pervasive misconception with respect to the
phraseology of the right to counsel warning developed within
the Seventh Circuit. This circuit court of appeals, in two deci-
sions, one in 1969 and another in 1974, decided that the basic
philosophy of Miranda warranted the requirement that the
warnings should be issued whenever a suspect about to be inter-
rogated was the "focus of suspicion.' 6 In other words, not only
were the warnings to be given when a suspect who [sic] was in
"custody" or "deprived of his freedom in any significant way,"
but also in situations where the investigators wanted to question
someone they suspected but had not yet placed in a custodial
setting. The rationale for this embellishment of Miranda was
the circuit court's perception of "focus of suspicion" as "psycho-
logical compulsion . . . tantamount to the deprivation of the
suspect's 'freedom of action in any significant way,' repeatedly
referred to in Miranda."17 This perception, however, was not ac-
ceptable to the Supreme Court. In its 1976 decision in Beckwith
v. United States, the Court unequivocally declared, with one jus-
tice dissenting, that "focus of suspicion" was not the test for de-
termining whether the Miranda warnings were required; the test
was, rather, whether a custodial situation existed. 8 Neverthe-
less, the "focus of suspicion" rule had prevailed within the Sev-
enth Circuit, which encompasses three large states, from the
time of its imposition in 1969 until the 1976 Supreme Court de-
cision in Beckwith, a span of nine years. After Beckwith, of course,
the issue was resolved for all federal courts and for all federal of-
ficers. "Custody," not "focus of suspicion," now definitely pre-
vails as the test throughout the federal system.
"6 United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d
1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
"United States v. Oliver, 505 U.S. at 305.
"425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). Justice Stevens, who authored the opinion in Oliver, took no
part in the Bekuwith case.
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Prior to Beckwith, a few state appellate courts had adopted,
or viewed with favor, the "focus of suspicion" test. One of them,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which had adopted the test in
1970,'g-and reaffirmed that position in 1975, ' has not rendered
any subsequent decision upon the subject since the Beckwith
case. This being so, the police of that state continue to give the
Miranda warnings whenever suspicion has focused upon the
person to be interrogated. Consequently, the mischief persists
in that state.2'
Another state whose courts had adopted the focus test re-
jected it after Beckwith, and the courts there now apply the cus-
tody test.22 The Colorado Supreme Court referred to the "focus
test" in a case decided shortly after Miranda, but the case actu-
ally involved a custodial situation.2 Since then, and even before
Beckwith, custody was declared by the courts of that state to be
the proper standard for the police to follow.
24
There is one final example of the mischief of Miranda that
deserves mention, although there are many others that might
be included. In the 1979 California Supreme Court case of Peo-
ple v. Braeseke,25 the police issued the Miranda warnings before
questioning a defendant in custody for a triple murder. Al-
though he waived his right to silence and to a lawyer, the de-
fendant later refused to talk without having an attorney present
when some incriminating physical evidence was pointed out to
him. The interrogation ceased, but as he was being booked, he
requested to speak "off the record." He then proceeded to ad-
mit the murder and told of the location of the gun he had used
in the killings. The California Supreme Court, in a 4 to 3 deci-
sion, held that the "off the record" request did not constitute a
" State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 178 N.W.2d 888 (1970).
"State v. Raymond, 305 Minn. 160, 232 N.W.2d 879 (1975).
"' The statement regarding the present police practice of giving the warnings in "focus of
suspicion" cases is based upon information received from a number of police officers and from
the director of one of the police training schools in Minnesota.
In People v. Martin, 78 Mich. App. 518, 521, 260 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1977), the court stated
that "at first blush, it would seem we are bound to follow the mandate of People v. Reed 393
Mich. 342, 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975)," which used the "focus" test, but followed Benkwith, as did a
subsequent Michigan appellate court case, People v. Schram, 98 Mich. App. 292, 296 N.W.2d
840 (1980).
People v. Off, 172 Colo. 253, 472 P.2d 123 (1970).
" See, eg., People v. Conner, 195 Colo. 525,579 P.2d 1160 (1978).
" 25 Cal. 3d 691, 602 P.2d 384, 159 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979).
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waiver. The confession and the evidence derived from it were
held inadmissible.
Up until 1966, the highest courts of over thirty states,27 and
one federal circuit court of appeals,28 had held that there was no
constitutional requirement that criminal suspects be warned of
their self-incrimination privilege prior to police interrogation.
Miranda v. Arizona changed this by declaring that the constitu-
tional privilege mandated the issuance of the warning to all cus-
todial suspects. In the words of Justice Clark, in his dissenting
opinion in Miranda, the case represented "one full sweep chang-
ing [of] the traditional rules of custodial interrogation which
this Court has for so long recognized as a justifiable and proper
tool in balancing individual rights against the rights of society."2
Justice Harlan also dissented in Miranda, in an opinion in
which Justices Stewart and White concurred. He made the fol-
lowing observation and prediction (writing, of course, even be-
fore the embellishments which the original warnings have
incurred over the years since 1966):
, After the grant of review by the Supreme Court of the United States, the case was re-
manded to the California Supreme Court "to consider whether its judgement was based on fed-
eral or state grounds, or both." California v. Braeseke, 446 U.S. 932 (1980). The California
court certified that its judgment was "based upon Miranda v. Aizona... and the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution." It added: "we reiterate [our opinion] in its entirety."
28 Cal. 3d 86, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980). Further review was denied by the United
States Supreme Court. 451 U.S. 1021 (1981).
The defendant Braeseke was retried and convicted. The prosecution used as evidence in-
criminating statements Braeske [sic] made while injail after his first conviction, during an inter-
view with Mike Wallace on CBS's "60 Minutes" T.V. program. Braeseke's defense at his second
trial was influence of an hallucinogenic drug ("angel dust") at the time of the killings.
' For an alphabetical listing of the state cases, see F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 169-71 (2d ed. 1967). Included, until 1965, were the state
courts of California and Oregon, but the supreme courts of both of those states changed their
position and prescribed the warning. See id at 173. They did so because of their broad interpre-
tation of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and a correct anticipation of what was forth-
coming in Miranda in 1966.
The only other pre-1965 requirements for the warnings appeared in the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure (Article 727), and in the Code of MilitaryJustice (Article 31).
" See United States v. Wilson, 264 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1959); Heitner v. United States, 149 F.2d
105 (2d Cir. 1945).
Also relevant are two 1958 decisions of the United States Supreme Court about whichJustice
Clark had this to say in his dissenting opinion in Miranda "To require all [the warnings and
rights prescribed by Miranda] at one gulp should cause the Court to choke over more cases than
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), which it
expressly overrules today." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 502.
" Id. at 503.
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There can be little doubt that the Court's new code would markedly de-
crease the number of confessions. To warn the suspect that he may re-
main silent and remind him that his confession may be used in court are
minor obstructions. To require also an express waiver by the suspect and
an end to questioning whenever he demurs must heavily handicap ques-
tioning. And to suggest or provide counsel for the suspect simply invites
the end of the interrogation.
The presence of counsel at an interrogation scene, alluded
to by the dissent, is the most damaging feature of Miranda's
mandate. Why? Because of the fact that when defense counsel
appears, his first act is to advise his client to keep his mouth
shut. The writer is not submitting a condemnation of such de-
fense tactics; the lawyer is simply following an unwritten rule
subscribed to by all lawyers in similar situations. The traditional
concept is that his role is of a partisan nature. His obligation is
to his client, and to no one else.1
On the trial court level, or whenever the judicial process has
begun, a lawyer's advice to his client to remain silent is a prac-
tice that reasonable laypersons can appreciate. The burden is
on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the fifth amendment requires that it must do so without
verbal help from the defendant. In practice, therefore, it is
considered fair and proper for defense counsel to keep the de-
fendant off the witness stand and force the prosecution to prove
its case without asking him to utter a single word. It is an en-
tirely different matter, however, to require the police to invite
the presence of counsel into an interrogation room, during the
investigation of a criminal case. This signals, as Justice Harlan
stated, "the end of the interrogation." And indeed it would be,
in all but the very exceptional case situation where, for instance,
counsel knows of an unassailable alibi.
The Court in Miranda formulated the warnings about the
right to counsel for the announced purpose of assuring that
custodial suspects would be made aware of their fifth amend-
ment self-incrimination privilege. That privilege, however, is
unrelated to the sixth amendment right to counsel, although
" I at 516-17. In a footnote justice Harlan stated that the Court's "vision of a lawyer 'mid-
gat[ing] the danger so untrustworthiness' ... by witnessing coercion and assisting accuracy in
the confession is largely a fancy; for if counsel arrives, there is rarely going to be a police station
confession." Id. at 516 n.12.
"' Consider the following comment from Justice Jackson's dissent in Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 59 (1949): "[u]nder our adversary system.... any lawyer worth his salt will tell the sus-
pect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances."
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the two rights are sometimes viewed as though in tandem. It is
well, therefore, to be mindful of the language of the sixth
amendment provision: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for hisdefense.
Apart from the lack of sound judicial reasoning underlying
Miranda, so eloquently expressed by the four dissentingJustices,
as well as the practical considerations the dissenters discussed,
there is another substantive factor worthy of consideration in
determining whether Miranda is deserving of vitality. The
Miranda doctrine did not evolve because of a perceived need to
protect innocent persons suspected of crime. It was created as a
product of the Warren Court's pursuit of its egalitarian philoso-
phy. Toward that objective the basic consideration was this: the
rich, the educated, the intelligent suspect very probably knows
from the outset that he has the privilege of silence, whereas the
poor, the uneducated, or the unintelligent suspect is unaware of
that privilege. Consequently, all persons in custody or otherwise
deprived of their freedom, must receive the warnings prescribed
in Miranda.
As commendable as is much of what the Warren Court at-
tempted or accomplished with its egalitarian philosophy in the
area of social inequalities emanating from a disregard of clearly
appliable [sic] constitutional provisions, the writer suggests that
the same egalitarian philosophy does not lend itself to the field
of criminal investigation. Foremost is the fact that a very high
percentage of the victims of crime are from the ranks of the
poor, the uneducated, or the unintelligent. It is of little com-
fort to them to be told that the warnings administered to the
person suspected of robbing or raping them, or of burglarizing
their homes while they were at work, was for the noble purpose
of equalizing humanity, and this is especially so in those in-
stances where the suspect, reasonably presumed to be guilty, ac-
cepted the invitation to remain silent, or where his conviction
was reversed because the Miranda rights were not properly ac-
corded him. The time to show compassion toward a criminal
3' U.S. CONST. amend. 'VI (emphasis added). In other decisions unrelated to the subject
matter of the present paper, the Supreme Court has interpreted "criminal prosecution" to ex-
tend to the very beginning of the judicial process, such as preliminary hearing or indictment.
Even in Miranda, however, the Court did not rule that the sixth amendment right was invoked
by a custodial interrogation; the right to counsel in that setting, as has already been stated, was
considered only as an implementation of the fifth amendment right to silence.
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suspect's unfortunate background is after a determination of
whether or not he committed the offense, not before.
There is no better refutation of Miranda philosophy than
the opinion of ChiefJustice Joseph Weintraub of the NewJersey
Supreme Court in a 1968 case, in which he stated:
There is no right to escape detection. There is no right to commit a
perfect crime or to an equal opportunity to that end. The Constitution
is not at all offended when a guilty man stubs his toe.- On the contrary, it
is decent to hope that he will. Nor is it dirty business to use evidence a
defendant himself may furnish in the detectional stage. Voluntary con-
fessions accord with high moral values, and as to the culprit who reveals
his guilt unwittingly with no intent to shed his inner burden, it is no
more unfair to use the evidence he thereby reveals than it is to turn
against him clues at the scene of the crime which a brighter, better in-
formed, or more gifted criminal would not have left. Thus the Fifth
Amendment does not say that a man shall not be permitted to incrimi-
nate himself, or that he shall not be persuaded to do so. It says no more
than that a man shall not be "compelled" to give evidence against him-
self.33
CONCLUSION
In Shakespeare's Henry VF the suggestion was made that
"[t]he first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." If we, as law-
yers, continue to tolerate the kind of mischief created by
Miranda, some laypersons may think Shakespear's idea was not
at all bad. The following suggestion is an effort to forestall such
an unfortunate event, although, to be sure, there are more real-
istic reasons for offering it.
The Supreme Court, at the earliest opportunity, ought to
overrule Miranda, or else uphold the validity of the test of con-
fession admissibility enacted by Congress shortly after Miranda,
as part of the 1968 "Omnibus Crime Bill., 34 It provides that a
confession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given." Congress submitted the following guidelines for deter-
mining whether a confession meets the test of voluntariness:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take
into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the
confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraign-
ment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest
and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of
the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at
State v. McKnight, 52 NJ. 35, 52-53, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (1968). The case involved a
Miranda issue.
m 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1969).
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the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant
was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and
that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not
such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the
assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was with-
out the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such
confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to
be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the
issue of voluntariness of the confession.
The state of Arizona enacted an identical provision in
1969.' A test case should be sought, therefore, either within the
federal system or within the state of Arizona, and brought to the
Supreme Court as soon as possible. Alternatively, the Supreme
Court on its own initiative might avail itself of a suitable oppor-
tunity to address the issue in a case that may already be in the
process toward Supreme Court consideration. Meanwhile, the
police and prosecutors should reconsider their Miranda prac-
tices, and the state as well as federal trial and appellate courts
should moderate their apprehension over possible reversals be-
cause of shortcomings in Miranda formalities. This three-
pronged approach to the problem would help diminish the
mischief of Miranda until the Supreme Court eliminates it com-
pletely or modifies its principles in conformity with the forego-
ing Congressional enactment.
"Awz. REv. STATS. ANN., § 13-3988 (1978).
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